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I. Introduction  
The 2010 HMGs were cast as an evolutionary step beyond the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (“HMGs”) and the 2006 Merger Commentary.  In this short article, we suggest 
further improvements that should be considered in the next revision of the HMGs. Our analysis 
is based on the observation that horizontal merger policy has suffered from under-enforcement 
and false negatives.    
Over the last 50 years, “Chicago School” thought has worked to persuade courts that “false 
negatives” (i.e., under-deterrence and insufficient interdiction of anticompetitive mergers) are 
less harmful to consumer welfare than are “false positives” (i.e., over-deterrence and excessive 
interdiction of potentially procompetitive mergers).1  However, the legal standard for mergers is 
“may be substantially to lessen competition.”  Interpreting the statute to mean the probability of a 
merger substantially lessening competition must exceed 50% would be significantly stricter than 
what U.S. courts actually do. It is not necessary to show such a high probability of the merger 
substantially lessening competition.   Instead, the standard requires only an “appreciable risk” or 
a “reasonable probability” that competition will be reduced.2  This point is recognized in the 
2010 HMGs, which state that the Guidelines “reflect the congressional intent that merger 
                                                 
* The authors are Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Salop) and 
Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics, Yale University School of Management (Scott Morton).  
We would like to thank Doni Bloomfield, Tanguy Brachet, Martino DeStefano, Joe Farrell, Dan 
Rubinfeld, Serge Moresi, Yianis Sarafidis, Carl Shapiro and Ilton Soares for helpful comments on these 
issues. This article will be published in the Review of Industrial Organization as part of the Symposium 
for the Tenth Anniversary of the 2010 Merger Guidelines.  
1 The goal of antitrust law, including merger law, is consumer welfare.  In the case of mergers among 
competing sellers, this corresponds to consumer surplus, not total surplus. This goal is reflected in the 
HMGs requirement that merger-specific cost savings must be sufficient to deter price increases.   
2 A standard based solely on the probability of consumer harm does not explicitly properly account for 
the level of expected harm if the harms of false positives and false negatives are unequal.  Thus, a 50+% 
standard would under-enforce if the harm from a false negative exceeds the harm from a false positive.   
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enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty about 
anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”3   
Greater weight on false negatives is reflected in the longstanding legal standard that mergers that 
create a significant market share in a concentrated market are legally presumed to be 
anticompetitive, and the burden is placed on the merging parties to rebut that presumption.  This 
presumption is analogous to a Bayesian prior.  If the presumption is triggered, the burden is 
placed on the merging parties to offer rebuttal evidence.  Thus, the default legal standard is to 
enjoin such mergers, absent evidence that either undermines the market share and concentration 
evidence or provides a procompetitive justification.  This standard is important because the 
HMGs are intended to be consistent with a merger law that is not premised on either the Pareto 
principle, total surplus or an overarching focus on preventing false positives.  In short, a default 
enforcement rule of “do nothing if the agency is unsure what will happen in the future” is clearly 
inapplicable to a merger enforcement policy designed to protect consumer surplus, as well as the 
wording of the statute itself.  Not enforcing is an active choice that can harm consumers.4   
There also is evidence that the enforcement agencies face significant resource constraints which 
require triage that inevitably leads to under-enforcement.  The number of transactions that can be 
effectively investigated or litigated is limited.  The agencies have resources to investigate only 
those mergers that suggest the most serious concerns, not all the mergers that raise real concerns.  
Constraints on the number of cases that can be litigated inevitably force the agencies to accept 
weaker than optimal consent decrees or even to clear mergers deserve to be remedied or 
enjoined.  Triage also naturally leads to under-deterrence.5  Triage further suggests to courts that 
the standard for illegal effects is much higher than it actually is, since the selection of cases that 
go to trial are disproportionately harmful.    
We have not seen evidence sufficient to rejects this hypothesis.  Consider the following: 
 Agency budgets have not kept pace with the number of reported mergers.  One would 
expect that more transactions would also involve more deals that raise potential 
concerns.  Table 1 reports agency budgets for the 2010-2018 period, relative to the 
number and value of merger transactions.  The BRM Index gauges the decline since 
                                                 
3 2010 HMGs at §1. 
4 If determination of competitive effects were fairly obvious, the choice of default might not matter,  But 
it seems self-evident that the likely effects are not obvious.  If they were, firms would not spend $15-25 
million going through a second request (or $10-20 million more on a PI hearing), if the required 
divestiture or the need to abandon or restructure the deal was so obvious at an earlier point.  Nor would 
merger retrospectives reveal significant false negatives. 
5 This is the reverse of the proverbial Texas Ranger with just one bullet, but who can deter a crowd 
because no one wants to take the risk of rushing him first.  But the Ranger fails to deter when all the 
members of the crowd move at the same time.  See Mark Kleiman and Beau Kilmer, The Dynamics of 
Deterrence,  106 PNAS 14230 (August 25, 2009), 
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/106/34/14230.full.pdf?html=. 
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2010 in the agency enforcement budgets relative to the number of merger 
transactions.  The BMV Index gauges the decline relative to the dollar value of M&A 
transactions. 6  Table 1 shows that budgets have declined by approximately 30% since 
2011, relative to M&A activity.  We also suspect that agency costs of second request 
investigations and litigation also have increased over time as the role of quantification 
has increased.   
 The number of second requests is much more stable than the number of reported 
mergers that might warrant intensive investigation.  Table 2 shows that the number of 
second requests has ranged between 42 and 55 in 2010-2018, while the number of 
transactions ranged from less than 1300 to more than 2000.7  This is consistent with 
the number of second requests being limited by resource constraints and some 
problematical mergers being cleared. 
 Table 2 also reports that a very high percentage of the deals that get a second request 
are challenged.  This suggests that only the very most troublesome mergers are 
investigated. This data also is consistent with some problematical deals falling 
through the cracks.  Indeed, most merger lawyers (who lack Stockholm Syndrome) 
have experienced surprise at deals that escaped without a challenge, or sometimes 
even without a second request.   
 The agencies have a very high win rate in litigated cases.  In the 2012-2018 period, in 
cases where the agencies filed a complaint without an accompanying consent decree, 
the agencies prevailed in more than 35 cases (i.e., either by winning in court, by 
obtaining a later settlement or by the parties abandoning the transaction).  The 
merging parties have prevailed in court in only 3 cases.  One loss was a “potential 
                                                 
6 We use the DOJ budget for the Antitrust Division. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATION FIGURES 
FOR THE ANTITRUST DIVISION FISCAL YEARS 1903-2021 (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/appropriation-figures-antitrust-division. However, our data for the FTC 
budget includes its consumer protection mission. Fed. TRADE COMM’N, FTC APPROPRIATION AND FULL-
TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) HISTORY (2020),  https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-
executive-director/financial-management-office/ftc-appropriation. The enforcement budget for any given 
year is a sum of those two figures. The adjusted number of mergers reported, i.e., transactions is which a 
second request could have been issued, comes from FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2018 22 & n.2 (2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-competition-
department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/fy18hsrreport.pdf. The M&A value data comes 
from the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances. IMAA, ANNOUNCED M&A IN THE UNITED 
STATES BY NUMBERS AND VALUE BY YEARS (2020), https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-a-us-united-states/.  
7 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2018 22 & n.2 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
bureau-competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/fy18hsrreport.pdf 
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competition” merger8 and one was a vertical merger,9 where the law is less 
favorable.10  This high win rate is consistent with both limited deterrence and risk-
averse agencies threatening to take only the most egregious cases to court.  A rough 
estimate is that the alleged post-merger HHIs in cases that have gone to trial for the 
past two decades have averaged above 5000 with average delta HHIs exceeding 
1500.11   
 The high stakes of the merging parties have incentives to spend considerable legal 
and economic resources in criticizing and rebutting the agencies’ quantitative 
evidence as presenting their additional econometrics.  The agencies must do more to 
keep up, but resource constraints limit their ability. The combination of high stakes 
for the merging parties and agency resource constraints also suggests that the false 
positive rate would be low.  The parties have incentives to fight very hard to justify 
their deal, whether the value of the deal flows from efficiencies or market power.   
 Econometric evidence is consistent with that consolidation leading to market power.12   
Economists have carried out a number of retrospective analyses of mergers showing 
                                                 
8 FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015). 
9 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.D.C. 2019).   
10 The agencies lost two cases filed in 2019.   One was litigated as horizontal but was as much a vertical 
deal.  United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 19-1548-LPS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64637 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 
2020).  The other was a straight horizontal merger case.  Federal Trade Commission v. RAG-Stiftung et. 
al., No. 19-2337, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18346 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2020). The data on wins has not yet been 
reported. 
11 Authors’ calculations.  
12 Some of the citations that follow separate out mergers from other anticompetitive activity. Some focus 
on macroeconomic evidence that demonstrates a grim, economy-wide increase in market power. See, e.g., 
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 
2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today/; Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona 
Scott Morton, Confronting Rising Market Power (Economists for Inclusive Prosperity, Policy Brief, 
2019), https://econfip.org/policy-brief/confronting-rising-market-power/; Fiona Scott Morton, Modern 
U.S. Antitrust Theory and Evidence Amid Rising Concerns of Market Power and its Effects (Washington 
Center for Equitable Growth, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/modern-u-s-antitrust-
theory-and-evidence-amid-rising-concerns-of-market-power-and-its-effects/; Joint Response to the House 
Judiciary Committee on the State of Antitrust Law and Implications for Protecting Competition in Digital 
Markets (April 30, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Joint-Response-to-the-
House-Judiciary-Committee-on-the-State-of-Antitrust-Law-and-Implications-for-Protecting-Competition-
in-Digital-Markets.pdf. For macroeconomic evidence on rising profit share, see Simcha Barkai, Declining 
Labor and Capital Shares (University of Chicago Stigler Center, New Working Paper Series No. 2, 
2016), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489965; Simcha Barkai & Seth G. Benzell, 70 Years of 
U.S. Corporate Profits (University of Chicago Stigler Center, New Working Paper Series No. 22, 2018), 
available at https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/research/-
/media/8ee68ec563aa4c70aa94897ee04f68b6. For macroeconomic evidence on the rise at the top end of 
the markup distribution, see Joshua Gans et al., Inequality and Market Concentration, When Shareholding 
is More Skewed than Consumption, 35 OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY 550 (2019). For labor 
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that a number of significant mergers have led to reduced competition even when there 
are consent decrees.13   
In light of this evidence, and our own judgement as observers of merger enforcement, our view is 
that the competitiveness of the U.S. economy would benefit from stricter merger enforcement.    
This article sets out a number of proposals that might be considered for the update to the HMGs.  
We frame our proposals in light of the 3-step burden-shifting approach used in merger law.  In 
Step 1, the agencies must present enough evidence of risk of anticompetitive harms in order to 
shift the burden to the merging parties to produce sufficient rebuttal evidence.  The agencies 
normally satisfy this burden through an anticompetitive “structural presumption,” which involves 
sufficiently high post-merger HHIs and HHI increases.14  If the parties produce sufficient rebuttal 
evidence in Step 2, then the burden shifts back to the agencies in Step 3 to persuade the court that 
the merger will fail the overarching legal standard.    
Concerns about false negatives suggest that the required evidence required of the agencies to 
satisfy their Step 1 case should be lowered, that the rebuttal burden placed on the merging parties 
in Step 2 be raised, and that the agencies’ ultimate burden of persuasion at Step 3 be reduced.  
These changes would deter more anticompetitive merger proposals and permit the agencies to 
negotiate stronger settlements .  Setting legal presumptions and evidentiary burdens is a legal 
issue, of course.  Senator Klobuchar recently introduced a Bill in 2019 (i.e., S307)  that would 
reduce the evidentiary burden on the agencies by replacing the standard from “substantially” 
lessens competition to “materially” lessens competition, where “materially” is defined to mean 
“more than a de minimis amount.”  It also would mandate a substantial rebuttal burden for 
certain large horizontal mergers, whereby the firms would be required to show that their deal 
would not materially harm competition, in contrast to current law, where the burden is placed on 
the government.   
                                                 
evidence on monopsony, including the negative effects of non-competes, see Austan Goolsbee & Chad 
Syverson, Monopsony Power in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Tracks (NBER, Working Paper No. 
26070, 2019), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w26070.pdf; Elena Prager & Matt Schmitt, 
Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hospitals (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 
Working Paper, 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3391889; Alan Kreuger & Orley 
Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector (NBER, Working 
Paper, 2018), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w24831. 
13 There have been numerous such studies by economists.  John Kwoka, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, 
AND REMEDIES (2020); David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton. Hospitals, Market Share, and 
Consolidation, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1964 (2013); Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, The Impact of 
Hospital.Consolidation—Update (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2012/06/the-impact-of-
hospital-consolidation.html; Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of Cross-Market 
Hospital Mergers (NBER Working Paper No. 22106 2016). 
14   The Step 1 burden alternatively could be satisfied with other evidence.   
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Absent legislation, agencies can change enforcement policies but not the legal burdens in court.  
However, because the courts respect the agencies’ expertise, the HMGs could have a role in 
influencing the law.  Thus, we will note some policy changes that will require changes in the 
law, not simply changes in agency enforcement policy reflected in the HMGs.   
II. Suggestions for Revisions in the HMGs  
We next suggest a number of revisions to the HMGs’ merger enforcement policy and some 
desirable legal changes that the HMGs might influence.      
A. Adopt an Anticompetitive Presumption Based the GUPPI and Eliminate the GUPPI Safe 
Harbor. 
The 2010 HMGs popularized the use of upward pricing pressure (UPP).  They describe in words 
the Value of Diverted Sales (VDS) and Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI).  They 
suggest the superiority of these metrics over the HHI for evaluating unilateral effects.15  We 
suggest the HMGs adopt an anticompetitive enforcement presumption based on the GUPPI that 
could meet the agency’s initial burden even if the HHI thresholds for the structural presumption 
are not.  While not law, this would be a first step to a legal presumption since the HMGs are 
designed to influence (i.e., “assist”) the law.16   
A GUPPI anticompetitive presumption would not be difficult to formulate.  If the simple 
GUPPIs for both merging firms are at least 10%, then the merging firms by themselves would 
more than satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test for a separate market, if demand is linear and 
the SSNIP threshold is 5%.17 This enforcement presumption would be rebuttable but should 
incorporate a sliding scale.     
In retrospect, the failure to adopt such a presumption likely made sense because  GUPPIs were 
still considered novel.18  However, this is no longer the case.  The HMGs did suggest a quasi-
                                                 
15 §6.1.  This remark might be read by a laissez-faire oriented court as recommending abandonment or 
weakening of the HHI anticompetitive presumption for complaints that allege unilateral effects.  Since the 
structural presumption is useful for reducing false negatives by resource constrained agencies, that 
language would be worth revising.   
16 HMGs at §1. 
17 Steven C. Salop & Serge Moresi, Updating the Merger Guidelines: Comments (November 9, 2009), 
https://loadtest.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/horizontal-merger-guidelines-
review-project-545095-00032/545095-00032.pdf; The Example uses the simultaneous GUPPI with 
uniform price increases, where GUPPIu = DR x M/(1-DR) =  20%.  With linear demand, the profit-
maximizing price increase is GUPPIu/2 = 10%.  As noted in Example 6, limiting the market definition 
solely to these two firms might not satisfy the additional test in the 2010 HMGs that the market must 
include products that are closer substitutes to either of the two merging firms than they are to each other.  
18 Both this anticompetitive presumption and adoption of a safe harbor was proposed by Moresi & Salop, 
supra note 17.   
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safe harbor for “low” values of simple GUPPIs, where “low” was subsequently defined as 5%.19  
In retrospect, this may have been a mistake.  The HMGs appear to be premised on the 
assumption that every merger will lead to significant merger-specific efficiencies and that an 
“efficiency credit” should be used to set the GUPPI safe harbor.  By contrast, evidence has 
accumulated that most mergers do not produce significant merger-specific efficiencies.20  This 
suggests that the GUPPI safe harbor might be deleted entirely.  It also suggests that a lower 
anticompetitive threshold might be adopted. 21   
B. Lower the “Red Zone” HHI Thresholds 
The 2010 HMGs raised the HHI threshold (“red zone”) for applying the anticompetitive 
presumption from a level of 1800 and a change of 100 (or, “1800/100”) to a level of 2500 and a 
change in 200 (or, “2500/200”).  In retrospect, this may have been an unfortunate choice.   
First, it is not clear why the HHI thresholds were increased, particularly since one goal of the 
HMGs was to reduce the burden of proof for establishing coordinated effects.  One possible 
explanation is that there has been a major shift in emphasis in merger analysis away from 
coordinated effects to unilateral effects.22 This shift to unilateral may have led to economists 
having a reduced interest in the HHIs and the red zone thresholds because the HHI level is not 
relevant for the determination of competitive effects in the typical unilateral effects models.   
However, in an important new paper, Nocke and Whinston show that the increase in the HHI is 
relevant in predicting the critical level of marginal cost savings to prevent consumer harm.  They 
show that consumer harm often outweighs assumed synergy levels even when the delta HHI is 
                                                 
19 2010 HMGs §6.1 (text at n.11).  In a subsequent speech when he was still the DOJ Economics Deputy 
AAG, Carl Shapiro suggested that “low” meant 5%.   Carl Shapiro, Update from the Antitrust Division 
(November 18, 2018) at 24, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518246/download. 
20 For one recent survey, see Nancy L. Rose and Jonathan Sallet, The Dichotomous Treatment of 
Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers: Too Much? Too Little? Getting it Right, UNIV. PA. L.R. (2020) 
(forthcoming) 
21 Note that simultaneous GUPPIs are higher than simple GUPPIs.  Jerry Hausman, Serge Moresi, and 
Mark Rainey, Unilateral Effects of Mergers with General Linear Demand, 111 ECONOMIC LETTERS 119 
(2010) (derivation of simultaneous GUPPIs).  In the HMGs Example 5, the simple GUPPI for each firm is 
GUPPI= DR x M, where the diversion ratio DR =33% and the percentage margin M =40%, so that 
GUPPI=13.2%.   If the diversion ratios between symmetric merging parties are both 33%, then simple 
GUPPIs of 13% translates into a simultaneous GUPPI of 22% (i.e., 13.2% x 1.67).  
22  The fraction of FTC second request investigations focused on unilateral effects rose from 16% in fiscal 
years 1989-1992, to more than half in 1999-2000, and to 76% in 2011-2014.  These figures do not include 
alleged mergers to monopoly.  Malcolm B. Coate and Shawn W. Ulrick , How Much Does the Choice 
between the Theories of Collusion and Unilateral Effects Matter in Merger Analysis? (October 17, 2019) 
at 2-3, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995679 
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less than 100 points.23  If synergies are assumed to be higher, then the critical delta HHI is larger.  
In light of the skepticism expressed in the HMGs regarding the level of verifiable and merger-
specific efficiencies, assuming very low (or de minimis) synergies would be more appropriate in 
setting enforcement policy.      
Moreover, in the current triage environment, lower thresholds would strengthen the agencies’ 
hand in the sliding scale and would improve deterrence and reduce false negatives.  Indeed, this 
enforcement benefit would follow even if the HHI entirely lacked predictive power. 
Finally, we are concerned that over time more permissive red zone will have an unintended 
adverse side effect of creating a “vicious cycle” that will result in even more permissive agency 
practice.  The vicious cycle could develop as follows.  Risk-averse agencies are strongly prefer to 
bring cases where they are highly confident that they will benefit from the “sliding scale,” 
whereby “the more compelling the [government’s] prima facie case, the more evidence the 
defendant must present to rebut it successfully.”24 As noted above, the HHIs in cases that reach 
trial far exceed the red zone thresholds. 
The HMGs are designed to assist the courts, who likely interpret the red zone threshold as the 
agencies’ expert opinion of the point where the anticompetitive legal presumption “should” 
apply.  This is reinforced by the fact that HMGs state the agencies’ “enforcement policy,” based 
on their “experience.”25  Thus, by announcing this higher internal threshold, the HMGs 
communicate to courts that a higher threshold for the structural presumption is warranted.    
This dynamic would tend to further weaken enforcement over the longer term.26  Even if the 
effect does not show up explicitly in the relatively small number of court decisions, it can change 
the behavior of potential merging parties and the agencies.  It can lead potential merging parties 
and their counsel to become more aggressive.  It similarly may lead to the agencies to further 
raise their internal litigation threshold out of fear that the sliding scale has shifted somewhat.  If 
more mergers are proposed, particularly more mergers with higher HHIs, the agencies will need 
to further adjust their triage process, which will cause feedback effects on second requests, 
                                                 
23  Volker Nocke and Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers (April 29, 
2020).  It also is an overstatement to say that the HHI level does not matter.  First, in the Cournot model 
with constant elasticity demand, the HHI equals the product of the weighted-average price cost margin 
and the demand elasticity.  Id. at equation (3). Second, if there is a small efficiency credit, the critical cost 
savings to prevent a consumer welfare loss is larger when the HHI level is higher. Id. at 21.  
24 United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
25 HMGs at §§1, 5.3 
26 We view this as a longer run trend rather than an effect that necessarily has occurred already and we 
lack evidence that this cycle is already underway.  Analyzing this hypothesis would require non-public 
data on the HHIs for mergers that are cleared without a remedy, as well as those that are challenged, and 
the consent decrees demanded.  It also would have to control for the policy goals of the different antitrust 
administrations as well as exogenous changes, such as the merger wave of the late-1990s and Great 
Recession.    
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consent decrees and litigation decisions.  These feedback effects necessarily will end up raising 
the internal red zone level.  And, as this information becomes known, the vicious cycle will be 
further reinforced.  In the end, unless budgets are increased accordingly, this vicious cycle will 
lead to increasingly more false negatives. 
C. Improve Analysis of Coordinated Effects 
Unilateral effects dominate merger enforcement, perhaps because those models are more 
tractable than coordinated effects models.  UPP measures and econometric-based simulation 
models can quantify unilateral effects.  By contrast, except where there is a maverick, 
coordinated effects analysis has been stuck in a process of weighing a checklist of facilitating 
and complicating market factors.   
Section 7.1 attempted to reduce the agencies’ burden of proof.  However, aside from identifying 
a maverick, it does not indicate what are “signs” of vulnerability are sufficient or the “credible 
basis” for concern.  Nor does it explain what evidence of pre-merger coordination should lead to 
a market definition price benchmark below the prevailing level.27  This is important because 
unilateral effects analysis typically assumes that the prevailing price represents a non-
cooperative equilibrium.    
There have been some theoretical advances in the analysis of coordination, which we do not have 
space to review, but more work is needed.28  There also have been some promising econometric 
studies that identify past mergers that have created the conditions for coordinated effects to 
thrive.29  In the U.S. beer industry, for example, Miller et. al. show that prices abruptly increased 
                                                 
27 For further analysis, see Jonathan B. Baker and Joseph Farrell, Oligopoly Coordination, Economic 
Analysis, and the Prophylactic Role of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, UNIV. PA, L.R. (2020) 
(forthcoming). 
28 See, e.g., Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Evaluating Mergers for Coordinated Effects and the Role of 
"Parallel Accommodating Conduct, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 651 (2013); Pierluigi Sabbatini, The Coordinated 
Effect of a Merger with Balanced Sharing of Collusive Profits, J. IND. COMPET. TRADE (June 2016). The 
role of the GUPPI or a similar UPP metric in analyzing coordinated effects might be explored in more 
detail.  A unilateral incentive to raise price may increase the likelihood and magnitude of successful 
coordination, for example, by altering the critical discount rate.   
29 For airlines, see Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate 
Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND J. Econ. 764 
(2014); Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto & Benjamin T. Leyden, Public Communication and Collusion 
in the Airline Industry (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2018-11, 2018); Severin Borenstein & 
Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work . . .Or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry, in 
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 63 (Nancy L. Rose, ed. 2014).   
For brewing, see Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the 
MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85 ECONOMETRICA 1763 (2017); Nathan H. Miller, Gloria Sheu & Matthew 
C. Weinberg, Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry (2019), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239248.  For hospitals, see Matt Schmitt, Multimarket Contact in 
the Hospital Industry, 10 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y361 (2018). 
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after the 2008 consummation of the Miller/Coors merger.  They explain these changes with a 
model of oligopolistic price leadership in which a dominant firm (ABI) publicly announces price 
changes and competitors follow its lead.30  In airlines,  multiple horizontal mergers have 
increased market concentration and exacerbated the problem of tacit collusion.  Ciliberto 
suggests that multimarket contact facilitates airline coordination.31   He also shows that U.S. 
legacy carriers communicate strategic intentions in earnings calls to induce market-wide 
reductions in capacity.  In work on cross-ownership, Spiegel finds that firms acquire minority 
shares in actual or potential rivals to stabilize collusive agreements.  Even if collusion breaks 
down, minority shareholding in rival firms helps to soften competition.32 
The growing potential for algorithmic coordination also suggests greater coordination effects 
concerns in the future.  Algorithmic coordination involves firms using the combination of Big 
Data and machine learning to successfully price coordinate in online retail markets.  Early papers 
suggest that algorithmic coordination is possible, but it would be a complicated endeavor in a 
world with exogenous shocks.33 However, algorithms likely will improve.   If a computer using 
machine learning can rapidly become a chess grandmaster, airlines,  then online sellers likely 
will learn how to successfully coordinate prices.  We encourage economists to complement and 
monitor the work that no doubt is being done by sellers and business consulting firms. An 
increased likelihood of algorithmic collusion through machine learning means that coordinated 
effects will be achievable in more environments. Mergers will tend to increase the likelihood of 
successful algorithmic coordination by reducing the number of major players.  This is another 
reason why merger policy needs to be tightened.   
D. Include Discussion of Common Ownership by Financial Funds 
The literature assessing the competitive effects of common ownership of product market 
competitors by financial funds is growing rapidly.34  If the empirical evidence continues to 
                                                 
30 The authors also simulate the 2013 ABI/Modelo merger and show that there would have been lower 
consumer surplus, absent the divestiture. Miller, Sheu & Weinberg, supra note  29. 
31 See Ciliberto & Williams, supra note 29; Aryal, Ciliberto & Leyden, supra note 29. 
32 See Yossi Spiegel et al., The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the 
Introduction of National Leniency Programs (Working Paper, 2019), available at 
https://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/MS-20190412.pdf. 
33 See Emilio Calvano et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion (Working Paper, 
2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304991; Calvano et al., Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion: 
What Implications for Competition Policy?, 55 REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 255 (2019). 
34  Lysle Bolle, and Fiona Scott Morton Testing the Theory of Common Stock Ownership (2020); José 
Azar, Martin C. Schmalz and Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FINANCE 
1513 (2018); José Azar, Sahil Raina and Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership And Bank Competition 
(2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252; Matthew Backus,, Christopher Conlon and Michael Sinkinson 
(2018), Common Ownership and Competition in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry (2018), 
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/clbe/events/antitrust/documents/sinkinson_cereal.pdf; 
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accumulate in a way that raises competitive concerns, the analysis of acquisitions of stock will 
require greater attention from the agencies. We recommend that the HMGs flag this issue now 
and discuss how the agency would approach such a case. We further recommend that the agency 
engage in research – and gathering of relevant information – to help inform future analysis. 
E. Adopt an Anticompetitive Presumption for Acquisitions of  Maverick Competitors  
The 2010 HMGs come close to suggesting an anticompetitive presumption if one of the merging 
firms in a concentrated market has been a maverick competitor.35  We agree and suggest that this 
be given more even visibility by making it a formal presumption in §7.1 and §2.1.5.  Maverick 
behavior was a focus of the HRBlock/TaxAct merger case, but the judge raised certain criticisms 
of the concept because all of the competitors were disruptive.36  It would be useful to address 
those concerns.  It also would be useful to consider applying the concept to “killer 
acquisitions.”37  The maverick presumption also might be applied in markets with HHIs below 
the level where the structural presumption is triggered.   
F. Expand Discussion of Post-Merger Competitive Interaction 
Merging parties commonly attempt to rebut the anticompetitive presumption by arguing that 
intense competition would continue post-merger.  However, the HMGs need more discussion of 
why post-merger competitive interaction among established firms generally would be 
insufficient to protect consumers.   In the Nash/Bertrand differentiated products model, for 
example, price increases by the merging firms will increase profits in the post-merger game.  
Moreover, price increases by the merging parties will generally lead to accommodating price 
increases by non-merging firms.38  This “multi-lateral” reinforcing effect is not flagged in the 
                                                 
Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon and Michael Sinkinson, The Common Ownership Hypothesis: 
Theory and Evidence, ECONOMIC STUDIES AT BROOKINGS (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/ES_20190205_Common-Ownership.pdf; Joseph Gerakos and Jin Xie, (2019), 
Institutional Horizontal Shareholdings and Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry (2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285161; Melissa Newham, Jo Seldeslachts and Albert Banal-Estanol, Common 
Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry (2018), 
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.591375.de/dp1738.pdf 
35 2010 HMGs, §7.1 
36 It also was important in the analysis of the AT&T’S attempted acquisition of T-Mobile in 2011.   
37 Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer and Ma, Song, Killer Acquisitions (April 19, 2020), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3241707.  Sabre’s acquisition of Farelogix may fit the “killer acquisition” 
model. 
38 Repositioning is a possible post-merger mitigating factor, so it would be useful to discuss when the one 
effect would tend to dominate the other. 
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HMGs.39  (The HMGs might tend to classify it as a coordinated effect, which also could confuse 
a court and so should be clarified.)    
G. Expand Potential Competition Merger Analysis  
The 2010 HMGs note that the analysis of mergers with potential competitors apply the same 
basic analysis as for horizontal mergers.  However, expansion is warranted.  In high tech 
markets, leading firms commonly make acquisitions of firms producing complementary (or 
vertically related) products while they are still potential or nascent.  These firms could become 
significant horizontal competitors over time or partners to competitors of the leading firms.  
Possible examples include Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp, Google’s 
acquisition of DoubleClick and AdMob, and Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi (the parent of 
Diapers.com) and Zappos.   
Current law sets an inappropriately high bar that is out of step with the competitive importance 
of those nascent or potential competitors.  The structural presumption does not apply if the target 
lacks a significant market share and its future share is not sufficiently predictable.  The agency 
must show that the target has a high likelihood of entering a highly concentrated market and 
having a significant competitive effect.  The likelihood prong generally also requires a concrete 
plan to enter soon.40  Potential entrants and nascent competitors may face a risk of failure, which 
must be examined.  The agency also must show that there are not a sufficient number of 
alternative entrants.  If the acquiring firm is not dominant, showing substantial high diversion 
ratios also might be required.41   
These requirements increase the risk of false negatives as the level of uncertainty inherent in all 
these predictions is high even while the mean effects may be large. A court also erroneously may 
focus on whether prices would rise above the current level rather than deter future price 
reductions. The court also may focus on the probability of a competitive effect rather than the 
expected value of the effect on consumer welfare.42  Finally,  a common path to entry in many 
technology markets is that an initially complementary service develops into a substitute, which 
                                                 
39 These issues arise naturally in simulation models.  But these effects are relevant even if there is no 
simulation modeling.    
40 E.g., FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (According to the FTC, it was only 
necessary to show that the potential competitor “probably would have entered” the market absent the 
merger,).  By contrast, in its 1984 BAT decision, the FTC required “clear proof” that entry would  have 
occurred.  In re B.A.T. Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852, 926 (1984) 
41 See, e.g., M. Sean Royall and Adam J. Di Vincenzo,  Evaluating Mergers Between Potential 
Competitors Under the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 25 ANTITRUST 33 (2010.) 
42 This amounts to failing to balance the consumer welfare effects of false negatives versus false positives.   
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may be hard for the agencies to map out with sufficient certainty to satisfy the current very high 
bar.   
We suggest several changes.43  First, the agencies might analyze the consumer welfare effects of 
the various possible paths and predict the expected value impact on consumer welfare, rather 
than focusing on the probability, and explain the importance of doing so.  The expected value 
impact on consumer welfare often will be negative, even if the probability that the entrant 
succeeds is significantly less than 50%.  Second, the HMGs might adopt an anticompetitive 
presumption for leading firm mergers, as discussed next.  Economists can help by producing 
careful retrospectives studies of cleared mergers, particularly when the nascent competitor was 
alleged not to compete at the time of the transaction.  Third, the agencies and the HMGs can 
explain why such a high bar is not warranted. 
H. Adopt an Anticompetitive Presumption for Leading Firm Mergers  
Enforcement also could be improved if the HMGs applied an anticompetitive presumption to 
acquisitions of small, nascent or potential competitors by leading firms and convinced the courts 
to follow them.  This presumption would not be novel.  The 1982 HMGs had a strong 
anticompetitive presumption when the leading firm had a share of at least 35% and the target had 
a share of at least 1%.44 
A strong presumption along these lines would be useful, particularly for digital markets where 
the “winning” firms is protected by strong network effects.  In such markets, the incumbent 
dominant firm has an incentive to acquire the entrant when it still is nascent, but may grow into a 
significant competitive threat.  The presumption also should apply to vertical or complementary 
product acquisitions that involve potential or nascent competitors that might grow into horizontal 
competitors or partners of horizontal competitors. 
This approach would require courts to follow the agencies’ lead.  However, as noted earlier, the 
courts respect agency expertise, so the HMGs would have an influence.  In addition, the HMGs 
do not exist in a vacuum.  The guidance can be supplemented by staff reports and supportive 
studies by academics.  Alternatively, this may be a possible area for new legislation.     
I. Clarify the Treatment of Econometric Evidence 
                                                 
43 See also Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 4 WIS. L. 
REV. 1035 (2004). 
44 1982 HMGs at §III.A.2. The 1982 HMGs focused on coordinated effects and formulated the 
anticompetitive presumption where the post-merger HHI exceeded 1800 and the increase in the HHI 
exceeded 100.  These Guidelines did not address unilateral effects except with respect to the Leading 
Firm Proviso. 
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Every year more data becomes available and economists naturally apply various econometric and 
associated simulation modeling to predict the competitive impact of current mergers.  The 2010 
HMGs encourage the use of these methodologies.45  We have concerns that, without 
clarification, the greater emphasis on econometric evidence will lead to additional false 
negatives, as discussed below, and we have suggestions to mitigate this concern.46  While we 
have some specific suggestions, our main point is that current practice is out of date.  The 
agencies should consider the approaches in the literature (and perhaps new research) and adopt 
an improved statistical standard for merger evidence. 
We will focus on the econometric evidence.  But before doing so, we note that econometric 
techniques exist to address only some competitive concerns but not others. Advances in 
technique often are not chosen because of the importance of the problem to real-world cases, but 
because the latest statistical advances permit progress in a particular direction.  Competitive 
concerns that lack econometric techniques are no less important to consumer welfare than others.  
For example, part of the reason that coordinated effects concerns have been given less emphasis 
in recent cases may be that economists have not developed an econometrically-intensive measure 
to predict their prevalence.  But if agencies or courts imagine that the lack of an econometric 
technique is the same thing as the lack of an answer, or a lack of importance, then entire classes 
of harm will go unenforced.  This also could be a reason that innovation concerns are typically 
given short shrift. 
It is useful to begin the discussion of econometric evidence by discussing the agencies’ risks of 
relying on econometric studies to make out their affirmative case in court.  First, data sets often 
are incomplete or contain some errors, and no econometric study is perfect.  As a result, it is 
possible to criticize even a rigorous, well-done study.  While agency staffs are well-equipped to 
separate the important criticisms from the mere debating points, the relative merits of the 
competing studies and the criticisms must be evaluated in court by a judge who is neither an 
economist nor a statistician.   This makes it difficult for the agency expert economist to fully 
explain the study and address all the criticisms made by the opposing expert. 
Second, the usual econometric practice is to place the burden on whichever side offers the study.  
For example, suppose a regression would predict that the merger harms consumer welfare if an 
estimated coefficient is negative and benefits consumer welfare if the estimated coefficient is 
positive.  Suppose the negative impact would be “economically substantial” if the coefficient is 
equal to (say) -2, or more negative.  Suppose that the regression coefficient estimate is -2.5, but 
is not statistically different from zero at a 90% level of confidence.  If this study were presented 
to the court by the agency to satisfy its burden of showing consumer harm, the merging parties 
                                                 
45 For example, see §2.1.2 (natural experiment evidence); §6.1 (simulation models)  
46 For further analysis, see David H, Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 13 (1983);  Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUMBIA 
L.R. 1048 (1985); Phillip Johnson, Edward Leamer & Jeffrey Leitzinger, Statistical Significance and 
Statistical Error in Antitrust Analysis, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 641 (2017) (hereinafter JLL).   
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would argue that the prediction of economically substantial harm be rejected because the null 
hypothesis of no (or positive) welfare effect cannot be rejected with sufficient confidence.   Of 
course, the agency can make the point that one also could not reject a null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is -2.5 or even -5, in which case consumer welfare would be harmed.  But this counter 
may fail because of the mistaken design of the prior; over-emphasis is commonly placed on 
whether the zero-value null hypothesis can be rejected.   
It is clear that p-values do not distinguish true from false claims.47  Standard hypothesis testing 
(as above) focuses on avoiding Type I errors, that is, erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is true. (Thus, this creates a neat correspondence between the Chicago School 
assumptions and this naïve form of econometrics.) However, Type II errors of erroneously 
failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false will have meaningful welfare implications in 
the type of cases that typically go to trial.  
 Stated in terms of false positive (Type I) and false negative (Type II) errors, the practice of 
treating an econometric result as reliable only when the confidence level is above a specified 
threshold (typically 90%, 95%, or 99%) guards against the likelihood of committing a false 
positive error (i.e., of erroneously rejecting the possibility that the merger will not lower 
welfare). In such a world, there has to be almost no chance that the merger harms consumers.  
But that is not what the statute or sound policy directs.  This is because by adopting this 
statistical stance, the probability of erroneously rejecting the alternative hypothesis that the 
merger will lower welfare will grow substantial as the threshold rises, yet avoiding a false 
negative error is critical for adhering to the law.  In other words, there is a fundamental trade-off 
between the two types of errors, and an exclusive focus on false positives is undesirable, both in 
terms of the text of the law and also from the perspective of consumer welfare. 
In our example, the solution actually is simple.  The decision maker can focus on the estimate of 
the expected consumer welfare effect, taking both types of errors into account with the proper 
weighting being based on the welfare function.  If the econometrics had been done correctly, the 
estimate of -2.5 is an unbiased (or consistent) estimate of the expected welfare effect.  In other 
words, it is equally likely that the true merger effect is greater or lower than -2.5.  In turn, the 
estimate would mean that it is more likely than not than the true merger effect merger is negative 
and economically substantial (i.e., more negative than -2).  If the welfare function is not linear in 
                                                 
47 In 2016, the American Statistical Association released a statement containing six principles regarding 
the use of p-values, including the following three principles: (2) P-values do not measure the probability 
that the studied hypothesis is true, or the probability that the data were produced by random chance alone;  
(5) A p-value, or statistical significance, does not measure the size of an effect or the importance of a 
result; (6) By itself, a p-value does not provide a good measure of evidence regarding a model or 
hypothesis.  Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on p-Values: Context, 
Process, and Purpose, 70 THE AMERICAN STATISTICIAN 129 (2016), 
https://doi.org10.1080/00031305.2016.1154108.   
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the estimated coefficient, then the expected welfare calculation amounts to placing differential 
weights on false positives versus false negatives.  
Kaye describes the problem as follows, where the “Alternative hypothesis” is a harmful merger 
that the court is attempting to learn about with the available evidence: “The more precise 
mathematical notation makes it plain that the burden of persuasion refers to one probability- 
Pr(Alternative hypothesis: Evidence) – while the hypothesis test looks to another – Pr(Evidence: 
Null hypothesis).”48 Because the Null hypothesis of no harm may not be true, the Pr(Evidence: 
Null hypothesis) test may not be very accurate, despite being universally used.  Rather, a prior is 
needed that takes account of all the information available before the trial. More generally, 
balancing the two types of errors “optimally” would also depend the strength of the other, 
possibly non-statistical evidence.  One possible approach would be the adoption of a Bayesian 
decision approach that makes use of prior information of the likely impact (based, for example, 
on structural presumptions, documentary evidences, or prior studies).49   For example, in the case 
of mergers that trigger the HHI structural presumption or another presumption, the prior 
distribution would be skewed towards anticompetitive effects.  The agency would then update 
this prior distribution in the face of the econometric evidence to arrive at a new, posterior 
distribution.50  In our example, if the prior is sufficiently skewed towards anticompetitive effects, 
the posterior may suggest that an economically substantial merger effect (-2 or worse) is more 
likely than not, even in cases where the standard econometric estimate is greater than -2 (i.e., less 
negative).  This can be used as the alternative hypothesis in the evaluation of Type II errors.   
This analysis leads us to make several suggestions.   
First, we suggest that the HMGs flag the fact that standard econometric practice tends to focus 
solely on false positives and explain the resulting limitations and the reasons why that approach 
will not be followed.51 We also recommend that the HMGs explain best practices for courts. The 
HMGs could discuss the different ways to take account of false negatives as well as false 
positives.  For example, merger retrospectives of mergers that were investigated but cleared by 
agencies or courts (often with conditions) find, on average, positive price effects.52  Along wth 
                                                 
48 Kaye, supra 46 at 22.  
49 See, JLL supra note 46 at 658-661 (presenting a Bayesian decision framework in which the strength of 
the econometric results and the prior probability of damages -- based on the other evidence -- combine to 
determine a posterior probability distribution for the damage amount that summarizes all the evidence and 
accounts for both types of errors). 
50 Because of the complexity involved in calculating the posterior, the Bayesian approach might be 
applied conceptually rather than formally.   
51 In fact, the D.C. Circuit criticized the requirement that statistical evidence satisfy the 95% confidential 
interval in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  See also Kaye, supra note 46. 
52 Author calculations based on data from John Kwoka, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2014) indicate the following price effects: overall mean = 
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the structural presumption, the distribution of those price effects might constitute an appropriate 
prior in a statistical test. We also recommend that the agencies encourage additional research in 
this area to develop new methodologies. 
Second, we suggest that the HMGs make it clear that the agency does not require quantitative 
evidence to satisfy its burden for the (Step-1) prima facie case, but can rely on the structural 
presumption or another anticompetitive presumption.  The HMGs also should make it clear that 
if the merging parties present quantitative evidence during the HSR investigation or in court -- 
once the burden has been shifted to them from the presumption having been triggered or other 
evidence-- the burden to show the statistical significance of the results rests on the parties, not 
the agency.   
Third, a complex back-and-forth between the experts can have the perverse effect of leading the 
judge to ignore all the econometric analysis (and, for that matter, the economic analysis) and rely 
instead on the self-interested testimony of the executives or the “hot documents.”53  For this 
reason, it would be useful for judges to have testimony on these studies by an objective court-
appointed expert economist or economic consultant for the judge.54  While this is not a strict 
HMGs issue, perhaps the HMGs could encourage it.    
J. Account for a Merger’s Effect on Systemic Risk  
Revised HMGs should consider taking account of the impact of mergers on welfare in the event 
of low probability, large exogenous shocks.55  The Covid-19 pandemic has made it clear that the 
invisible hand may not adequately account for large exogenous shocks that create negative 
externalities on consumers.  For example, it appears that mergers of meat processors have left the 
U.S. with a small number of large plants. When workers get sick, plant closures cause large 
reductions in the demand for animals from farmers, as well as shortages and increased prices 
paid by consumers. Similarly, pharmaceutical industry mergers may have caused significant 
concentration in supply chains and logistics.  If a shock hits a region of China and raw materials 
are not available from the supplier there, the resulting shortages cause more consumer harm than 
they would have when the second manufacturer sourced from a different place, harm that would 
not fall on the manufacturers. These examples motivate a general point. If scale economies lead 
to mergers and associated plant or logistical consolidation for each firm, then the risk of 
                                                 
7.24%; N = 42.  For mergers cleared during Democratic administrations, mean= 6.79%; N=28.  For 
mergers cleared during Republican administrations, mean=8.14%; N=14. 
53 State of New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434-VM-RWL (S.Dist. NY, 2020) 
54 This has been done on occasion.  For example, Alfred Kahn served as consultants to the judge in the 
1995 Post/Nabisco cereals merger case that involve warring econometrics by Ronald Cotterill and Daniel 
Rubinfeld.  New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S. Dist. NY 1995) 
55 A fuller treatment of how such risk should be accounted for in merger review is laid out in  a recent 
article by Bloomfield, and the references therein.  Doni Bloomfield, Competition and Risk (April 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566661;  
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disruption (e.g., epidemic, earthquake or nuclear power plant meltdown) will lead to a larger cost 
and price impact than if there were more diversity.56 The price impact also will be higher if a 
dramatic increase in demand bumps up against more limited production capacity caused by 
mergers that reduce excess capacity.57  Effects in intermediate goods markets also can cascade 
across multiple markets, just as did the harms from 2007-08 financial meltdown, as well as an 
earthquake in Japan.58   
This raises the question of whether merger analysis should take systematic account of the 
potential risks from such shocks.59  An increased potential for such harms resulting from a 
merger should be viewed as an adverse “competitive effect.”.  The HMGs make the point that the 
costs of achieving efficiencies are included in the competitive effects analysis, and this increased 
risk is such as cost.60  One cannot assume that firms would sufficiently account for the risks from 
such shocks, if a substantial fraction of the effects would be externalized.  For example, if 
positive demand shocks because lead to higher prices from capacity constraints, the higher prices 
would be passed on to consumers.  Bankruptcy may partially externalize other harms.  Of course, 
consolidation sometimes can reduce the likelihood of cascading failures, by internalizing some 
risks, so that offset also must be factored into the analysis. 
The more difficult question is whether the potential for such shocks can be identified in advance 
and whether the harms are sufficiently high to make such low probability events worth taking 
into account in merger analysis. The increasing interconnectedness of the international economy 
and the frequency of crises in the last two decades suggests that the research evidence likely 
exists, but it has not been assessed for possible inclusion in the HMGs. 61   
                                                 
56 For example, suppose that two mergers reduce the number of manufacturers from four high cost firms 
to two low cost firms, so that prices fall despite the increased concentration.  While price levels might be 
only slightly lower in normal times, the impact of one plant shutting down for an extended period of time 
might be much higher after the consolidation.  Of course, the expected value of consumer welfare also 
depends on the likelihood of an extended plant shutdown.   
57 Competitive markets tend to lead to more excess capacity, because the rivals need additional capacity to 
increase their shares. 
58  See Christoph E. Boehm et al., Input Linkages and the Transmission of Shocks: Firm-Level Evidence 
from the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 60, 62 (2019).  More generally, see Darron 
Acemoglu et al, The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations, 80 ECONOMETRICA 1977 (2012). 
59 Concern with exogenous shocks is not new.  It has been recognized by merger analysts that it was risky 
to rely on imports to constrain price increases by concentrated domestic firms because there might be 
substantial changes in exchange rates or import quotas, including quotas proposed by the merging firms. 
60  See HMGs §10 (“Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced by the merger or incurred 
in achieving those efficiencies.”)  
61  For example, see David Rezza Baqaee & Emmanuel Farhi, The Macroeconomic Impact of 
Microeconomic Shocks: Beyond Hulten’s Theorem, 87 ECONOMETRICA 1155 (2019). 
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K. Stress the Need for Skepticism Towards the Opinions of Business Witnesses  
The HMGs refer to the fact that evidence is obtained from various sources – the merging parties, 
customers, and other industry participants and analysts.  The HMGs express some skepticism 
regarding the views of rivals, except where the competition concern is exclusionary conduct.62   
It is surprising that the same skepticism is not expressed with respect to testimony by executives 
from the merging parties.  The HMGs merely state that “[t]he Agencies give careful 
consideration to the views of individuals whose responsibilities, expertise, and experience 
relating to the issues in question provide particular indicia of reliability.”63  
New HMGs should explain in more detail the fact that unsupported claims from individuals 
employed by the merging parties that they will not raise prices, or promises that are not 
embedded in consent decrees or binding private contracts, should be viewed very skeptically for 
several reasons. First, company officers and Board of Directors have fiduciary duties to 
shareholders to maximize profits (using legal strategies).  If the merger creates the economic 
incentive for the merged firm to raise price (or reduce output, quality or innovation), then such 
strategies will and must be implemented. Second, an executive may have financial or career 
benefits from the merger that distort his incentives or beliefs.  Third, the relevant “person’s” 
behavior in an antitrust case is the corporate person, not any particular executive. Therefore, 
courts should focus on the evidence showing the incentives of the firm and testimony about those 
incentives, not contrary self-serving statements.  
The opinion of the judge in the AT&T/Time Warner vertical merger case provides an example.  
The judge was highly dismissive of the testimony of the cable company executives that testified 
against the merger. These companies were the direct customers of Time Warner and would 
suffer price increases for Time Warner conduct, according to the DOJ complaint, as well as 
being downstream competitors of AT&T.  The judge believed that there was a “threat that such 
testimony reflects self-interest rather than genuine concerns about harm to competition.”64  By 
contrast, the judge did not apply this same degree of skepticism towards the testimony of the 
executives of the merging firms, who did not even have these mixed motives.  The HMGs should 
make it clear that the unit of observation in a merger review is the company, not the executive.  
If ordinary course documents, written by managers “in the field” as they attempt to earn profits 
for their company, reveal the strategy of the company using the tools familiar to the agencies and 
economists, this should be the focus of the court.   
 
III. Conclusions 
                                                 
62 HMGs §2.2.3 
63 HMGs §2.2.3 
64 AT&T/TW Op. at 92 
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While the 2010 HMGs were a definite advance, experience suggests that there is more to do.  We 
hope that our suggestions will be helpful.   
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Appendix: Tables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Agencies’ Budget Shortfalls (2010-2018) 
Budget-to-Merger Indices 
 
Year      2010     2011     2012     2013     2014     2015     2016    2017     2018 
BRMI      126     100      105       110        88        81         83        75         72  
BMVI          127     100        130       103        58        52         73        75         67 
 
BRMI = Indexed Ratio of Enforcement Budgets to Adjusted Number of Mergers Reported (2011 
Index = 100) 
BMVI = Indexed Ratio of Enforcement Budgets to Total Value of US M&A Transactions (2011 
Index = 100) 
Table 2 
Second Requests vs. Number of Transactions  
For Which Second Requests Were Possible (2010-2018) 
 
Year    2010    2011     2012     2013     2014     2015     2016    2017     2018 
No. of Transactions*             1,128   1,414    1,400    1,286    1,618    1,754     1772   1,992    2,028  
Second Requests         42       55         49          47        51         47          54        51         45 
Challenged Transactions**    33       35  43   30        32         42          46        39   38 
 
*adjusted transactions in which a second request could have been issued 
**includes only challenges of unconsummated mergers; challenges are listed in the year of the second request 
